“Religion” and “philosophy”

If “religion” is essentially institutional, then believing and confessing “Mohammed is a true prophet” or “Jesus is Lord” isn’t necessarily religious. Which is absurd.

But if “religion” broadly encompasses “any set of values, beliefs, and practices”, then almost everything we do, including almost everything the government does, is religious.

That “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” is either a narrow or broad restriction, depending on the definition of “religion.”

This reminds me of “philosophy”, which is at minimum just “a way of thinking.” Everyone thinks. Some people are just more thoughtful about their thinking than others. So, your philosophy might not be that philosophical, but it’s still a philosophy. Or something like that.

It is for these reasons that I do not like the terms “religion” and “philosophy”, or “religious” and “philosophical”. People are in denial about just how broad and thorough and pervasive their own philosophy and religion are. Using terms like “religion” and “philosophy” feed our comfortable delusions of compartmentalization. They give us a false sense of security in the supposed sacred vs. secular divide.

We are living, walking, talking, working, breathing centers of beliefs, practices, thoughts, values, and feelings.

An Unexpected Dialog

“Daddy, is Jesus God, and God Jesus?” (John Caleb)

“Yes. And God is three persons: The Father, the Son Jesus, and the Holy Spirit. They have always been together, and they have always been one God. And do you know what?”

“What?”

“The Father looooves the Son Jesus. And do you know what?”

“What?”

“The Son looooves the Father. And the Holy Spirit loves the Father and the Son too. And the Holy Spirit loves the Father loving the Son, and the loves the Son loving the Father.”

“Daddy, BYU is the best team EVER.”

“Huh?”

“Yeah, Anna [classmate?] says they have more candy than any other team.”

The Euthyphro dilemma seems to undercut moral realism

A version of the Euthyphro dilemma:

1. If morality is not grounded in a particular being’s nature, then one either must ground it externally in another being, or not ground it at all (i.e. be ultimately arbitrary and capricious).

2. It is not probable that morality is grounded in God’s nature.

3. Therefore it is probable that morality is grounded in a being external to God, or that morality is not grounded at all.

But:

4. It is more probable that morality is grounded in a necessary being than in a contingent being.

I can agree with with premise #1, but not premise #2. But if #1, #2 and #4 are all true, then:

5. Therefore it is probable that morality is not grounded in any being and is ultimately arbitrary and capricious.

#5 contradicts moral realism. Therefore if an atheist wishes to be a moral realist, he must reject at least premise #1 or #2 (refuting the Euthyphro dilemma, at least that version of it) or premise #4.

Commonly acknowledged criteria for inference to the best explanation

1. Explanatory scope. The best hypothesis will explain a wider range of data than will rival hypotheses.

2. Explanatory power. The best hypothesis will make the observable data more epistemically probable than rival hypotheses.

3. Plausibility. The best hypothesis will be implied by a greater variety of accepted truths and its negation implied by fewer accepted truths than rival hypotheses.

4. Less ad hoc. The best hypothesis will involve fewer new suppositions not already implied by existing knowledge than rival hypotheses.

5. Accord with accepted beliefs. The best hypothesis, when conjoined with accepted truths, will imply fewer falsehoods than rival hypotheses.

6. Comparative superiority: The best hypothesis will so exceed its rivals in meeting conditions (1) through (5) that there is little chance of a rival hypothesis’s exceeding it in fulfilling those conditions.

– Moreland, James Porter; William Lane Craig. Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (p. 62). Intervarsity Press.

The counterintuitive hypocrisy of moral anti-realist atheists

Source: http://www.flickr.com/photos/28705377@N04/4198670755/

‎”Moral anti-realist” atheists don’t practice what they preach.

They tell us there are no real objective moral values or duties, and then they participate in transcendent moral causes regarding objective human dignity, rights, and values.

Like a man who says there is no such thing as baseball, and then knocks on your door with his mitt, ball, and bat, and says, “Come play ball!”

Like a man who says there is no such thing as a beautiful sunset, and yet has a beautiful painting of one on his bedroom wall.

Like a woman who says children have no dignity, value, or real beauty, as she rocks her baby, cooing, singing, loving.

Moral anti-realist atheists are hypocrites because they otherwise love and celebrate and participate in what they say doesn’t exist. They are hypocrites for being good neighbors, friends, citizens, human beings — lovers of humanity, lovers of beauty, lovers of a good moral cause. They treat humans like souls, animals like creatures, and life like a meaningful epic to be written.

Truth, joy, and transcendent duty

Two atheistic assumptions:

1) Maximal joy does not likely come with maximal belief in truth and minimal belief in falsehood.

2) We have no transcendent duty to maximize our belief in the truth and minimize our belief in falsehood.

Convincing a person that they “ought”[1] to pursue the truth at all costs requires convincing a person that these are false assumptions. But how can you really convince a person of that? One could ask, “How do you know that, when one has discovered the truth, it won’t be terribly depressing?” And one could say, “If Truth is not an ultimate person, then none of us are obliged to it.”

Hence, it must be seen with the eyes of the heart.

“[He] has shone in our hearts to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ.” (2 Corinthians 4:6)

[1] “Ought” here means both “moral obligation” and “rational means to an end.”

We have two hearts

“If your heart breaks, are you still alive?” (John Caleb)

“No, you die.” (Me)

“But when you die and go to heaven, do you still have a heart?” (John Caleb)

“Yes, you’re right. You still have a heart. The heart of your soul. We have two hearts: the heart of our body, and the heart of our soul.” (Me)

“So we have TWO hearts? Wow. That is amazing. I did not know that. The heart of our body must be the lub-dub one.” (John Caleb)